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Technology Transfer:
A View from the Trenches
Harvey Drucker*

Introduction
Argonne and I, for various reasons, are generally interested in
technology transfer and specifically interested in the development of
commercial technology from basic and applied research in biology and
medicine. One of my responsibilities accounts for my generic interest. I
have lab-wide responsibility for technology transfer, that is, the
conversion of discoveries made through tax-supported research into
commercial products or services that benefit the general public.
Technology transfer has been recognized by our primary research
sponsor, the Department of Energy (DOE); by Congress, and
increasingly, by industry as a key element in U.S. efforts to improve its

technological competitiveness.
More specifically, as Associate Director of the lab, the Argonne
Center for Mechanistic Biology falls within my purview. We have a very

active group developing methods for genomic sequencing based on
DNA hybridization. We will be running what I consider the principal
user facility for structural biology in the U.S. sometime in 19961 and

are in the process of developing a computational biology group that we
hope will provide the software and hardware for converting biological
data into simple chemical and medical technology.

Anyone who reads the newspaper or looks at television has to be
aware that the nation is in economic trouble. Politicians, from the

President to County Commissioners, either wring their hands or claim
Dr. Drucker is Associate Laboratory Director for Energy and Environmental
Science and Technology at Argonne National Laboratory. He received his B.S. and
Ph.D., both in biology, from the University of Illinois at Chicago.
1 The Structural Biology Center at the Advanced Photon Source.
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victory based upon tenths of percent changes in employment; gross
national product or balance of payments. Joblessness makes good copy
when there isn't a beached whale or a middling quality murder to
report. Still, these headlines reflect an underlying weakness in the U.S.
economy.
Loss of Market Dominance
It started a decade ago when we lost market dominance in what
were then called the basic industries such as steel and automobiles.
First, we lost in the international markets. Then, we lost at home. Next,
we fell behind in high-tech markets such as consumer electronics and
computers.
Underlying this was a destructive cycle: Weakened financial
positions led to lower investment in research and development (R&D)
and led to further loss of market; that led to further financial weakness.
This cycle was aggravated by a decade of takeover sharks threatening
leveraged buy outs; corporations taking poison pills and a corporate
focus foreshortened down to the next quarterly dividend. Add to this a
work force no longer at the forefront in literacy and mathematics,
coupled with basic industrial technologies that require less hands but
greater training. Throw in non-uniform occupational and environmental
regulation, and you have the makings of a very bad brew.
Last year, it was reported that U.S. spending for R&D has started
to fall for the first time since the 1970's while foreign rivals have
increased research investments. 2 For example, Japan is said to equal
or surpass the U.S. as the world's top patron of industrial R&D. 3 It is
also worth noting that Japan's R&D budget overwhelmingly addresses
civilian research, causing an even greater disparity in terms of potential
market impact for their dollars versus ours.
2 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators (1992). This report
indicates that annual national expenditures for R&D fell from $154.3 billion in 1989
to $151.6 billion in 1990. Preliminary analysis was also found to indicate that 1991
and 1992 totals might be down even further.
3 Competitiveness Policy Council.
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Reasons for Loss of Competitiveness
From my reading, I conclude that there are many reasons for our
loss of competitive position. For example, the target of heavy criticism,
is our traditionally poor integration of publicly- and privately-funded
R&D; we look especially deficient compared to the Japanese, where
integration is part of the political and economic culture.
Also, we have lacked close collaboration between research
universities, national laboratories, research hospitals and corporations.
However, historically, we haven't needed it: For most of the modern
era, our publicly-funded R&D centers were the acknowledged world
champions in basic research. Our corporations were acknowledged
world champions in industrial applications. The traditional theory
seemed to work, i.e., that discoveries would be made in the public
sector and trickle down through an intellectual gravity flow to industry
and the public.
This may still be true in medical R&D, but we unfortunately held
on to that theory long after losses in world markets indicated that it
wasn't working well enough. Meanwhile, decades of separation between
corporations, universities and federal labs had erected psychological and
legal barriers.
Psychological Barriers
Three distinct species of elitism worked against collaboration
between corporations, universities and federal labs. First, most
industrial research organizations were permeated with the suspicion that
inventions that did not come from the in-house organization probably
were of questionable value. Second, many universities let traditional
concern for academic freedom interfere with the role they could play in
industrial support, research hospitals tended to limit collaboration with
their related universities, and national laboratories were slow to give up
their self image as free-standing centers of scientific and technological
expertise. Federally-funded researchers tended to put new technologies
on the shelf for customers to pick and choose - rather than to consider
commercial applications of their inventions and pursue potential
customers.
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Legal Barriers

One set of legal barriers to collaboration seems to be our apparently
unique antitrust laws and attitudes. These blocked research
collaboration of many kinds and made corporate research and legal
executives chary of involvement with one-another or with publiclyfunded R&D. Extending well beyond antitrust, we seem to have had,
at least for civilian purposes, a distinctly adversarial relationship between
government and industry. Thus, we have had no creatures like
Mitsubishi Shoji, trading companies that could cross technological lines
easily and bring semiconductors to watches or ceramics to scissors.
Somewhat related was the apparently logical prohibition against the
federal government granting to one company exclusive rights to
4
discovery that had been paid for by everyone's tax money.
Congress, federal administrators and others had a mortal fear of
government technology making someone rich. What if, perish the
thought, this resulted in a Xerox or a Polaroid?
If we give invention to everyone, it lowers the chance that anyone
will gain undue advantage from tax money or that anyone will become
disgustingly wealthy. The flaw in this logic was revealed when it
became apparent that few if any companies would invest the money
needed to convert a scientific discovery into a market-ready product
without some kind of reasonable opportunity to recoup their risk
capital. 5 The result was that discoveries belonging to everyone, often
ended up being exploited by no one.

4 For an overview of the situation, see, e.g., Robert Van Ravenswaay,
Government Patents and the Public Interest, 19 Idea 331 (1978). [Ed.]
5 See, e.g., Ronald E. Barks, Accessing and Licensing Federal Technology,
Licensing Law and Business Report, May-June, 1992, at 76, "[F]or every $1 of
research, a company spends $10 to develop the product and another $100 to take it to
market." [Ed.]
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The Times They Are A-Changin'
We seem to be entering an era where industrial delivery of research
conceived in government labs is a blessed event - especially if it creates
jobs for Americans - even if it should provide a few minor country
estates. As discussed by Lawrence Rudolph elsewhere in this issue,
agencies like the DOE, spurred by several Congresses and Presidents,
have done a U-turn in dealing with proprietary rights. Corporations can
now protect resources invested to develop a discovery made at a
national laboratory.
One of the newest and best mechanisms to accomplish this is a
cooperative R&D agreement (CRADA). Under a CRADA agreement,
Argonne and a corporation make an (usually co-equal) investment in an
approved project, and the company retains proprietary rights.
Currently, Argonne has signed 30 CRADAs and is negotiating over 40
6
more.
For example, Argonne fostered the organization of the Midwest
Plant Biotechnology Consortium with sixteen midwestern universities
and 35 agri-business corporations. We originally called a meeting of
this group at which industrial representatives specified major problems
that could be solved with scientific research. The universities and
Argonne chose problems they believed they had the capability to solve.
A series of partnerships were formed, and grants were awarded based
upon relevance to application and technical excellence. Since 1988, we
have averaged about $4 million per year to fund such research, and, in
1992, a new activity involving bulk chemical production through
biotechnology was funded at about the same level.
Another example that could have trust-busters rolling over in their
graves is our current Battery Research Program. The bulk of that DOE
research funding will go to a collaboration with the Big Three auto
makers called the United States Advanced Battery Consortium or
USABC. Industry will match funds with the national laboratories and
associated institutions to develop better batteries, better vehicles and,
6

Including ones with Baxter Health Care (blood), Notre Dame (bugs to eat

contamination in soil), Caterpillar (inspection of ceramic-coated engine parts), Allied
Signal (ceramic erosion in engines and petrochemical pumps).
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especially, concepts designed to take autos out of the environmental
equation.
Recently, General Motors (GM) on its own had a "garage sale" at
which national labs were invited to offer their good ideas for sale
through displays, literature and personal representatives. GM research
teams engaged in intensive "shopping" at this pioneering bazaar.
Argonne has also chartered the Argonne-University of Chicago
Development Corporation, or ARCH, to foster commercialization of
scientific discoveries made at the university or within the laboratory. It
negotiates with corporations to license inventions and patents, set up
joint ventures or establish new companies.
Another traditional area of cooperation between Argonne and nonArgonne researchers has been through our "user facilities," giant
research machines too expensive to duplicate at campuses and industrial
parks. Such facilities are open to use by researchers from other national
labs, industry, hospitals or universities.
Currently, Argonne is building what we believe will be the most
effective user facility that the nation has ever constructed. More than
300 scientists and engineers will perform as many as 100 different
experiments simultaneously on the machine. It is a $456 million
accelerator called the Advanced Photon Source (APS). The APS will
generate the world's most brilliant X-rays for materials research. These
X-ray beams, 10,000 times brighter than those of existing X-ray
sources, will reveal the atomic and molecular structure of materials to
improve America's competitiveness in areas such as steels, medicine,
semi-conductors, polymers, pharmaceuticals and catalysts.
The APS has attracted more industry participation in its planning
stages than any basic research facility previously built in the U.S. One
demonstration of its value is creation by thirteen pharmaceutical
companies of a consortium to build and operate their own beam lines.
A further indicator of APS's value to industry is that both Japan and
Europe are rushing to set up their own version.
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Conclusions
What might all of this mean for those interested in the human
genome and/or development of commercial technologies from
genomic research?
On the positive side, we now have contractual instruments and
technology transfer models that, with a little work, should be adaptable
to new private sector ventures in biology. They are being used;
companies are receiving exclusive rights to intellectual property, and
federal labs, their technical staffs and sponsors are seeking to make
deals.
On the other side, we have a growing federal technology transfer
bureaucracy, as office upon office gets involved in issues such as
conflicts of interest, foreign preferences and profit dissemination. If
anything can destroy technology transfer, especially to small businesses
with finite legal budgets, this is it. Also, federal labs now have no unearmarked pots of money for codevelopment of technologies. Each
piece of work that departs from what was originally proposed requires
separate dispensation - stalling or stopping good ideas while agencies
wait for the next fiscal year or until Congress considers budgets.
Moreover, federal technology transfer policies and practices are not
uniform. Different federal laboratories and their scientists accept or
reject particular cooperative projects based upon their histories,
interpretations of law and perceptions of their sponsor's, e.g., the
DOE's, attitude.
Finally, enabling legislation and pioneering mechanisms for
technology transfer are insufficient, themselves, to overcome major
barriers to collaboration. A major barrier is cultural differences among
parties to these partnerships. To collaborate effectively, personnel in
each institution must get to know the strengths and peculiarities of
other institutions. A university researcher who disdains concern with
market response is bound to have trouble working with an industrial
partner, and a corporate researcher with no tolerance for federal
bureaucracy has a hard row to hoe in working with a national lab.
Likewise, an Argonne researcher unaware of university sensitivity to
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dominance by large federal institutions probably is going to strike out
in dealing with R&D partners from those institutions.
Overall - especially where research is far ahead of development, as
with the human genome project - things are nevertheless looking
good. I and other federal technology transfer personnel invite people
from corporations to visit Argonne, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge and our
other brethren, where they just might find something interesting.

